The following words by Alan Turing in 1951, I have quoted before:
- My contention is that machines can be constructed which will simulate the behaviour of the human mind very closely. [...] Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that these machines are a genuine possibility, and look at the consequences of constructing them. [...] It seems probable that once the machine thinking method had started, it would not take long to outstrip our feeble powers. There would be no question of the machines dying, and they would be able to converse with each other to sharpen their wits. At some stage therefore we should have to expect the machines to take control.
Now, in collaboration with economist James Miller and computer scientist Roman Yampolskiy, we have another paper on the same general circle of ideas, this time with emphasis on the aspects of Omohundro-Bostrom theory that require careful scrutiny in light of the game-theoretic considerations that arise for an AI living in an environment where it needs to interact with other agents. The paper, whose title is An AGI modifying its utility function in violation of the strong orthogonality thesis, is published in the latest issue of the journal Philosophies. The abstract reads as follows:
- An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the strong orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI’s intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory. Nothing in our analysis weakens arguments concerning the risks of AGI.