Sara berättar att hon giftes bort som 15-åring till en 11 år äldre släkting. Morföräldrarna utsåg maken. Enligt Sara fick hon inte fortsätta studierna när giftermålet var bestämt, och maken skrämde henne när de träffades enskilt.
– Han talade illa om min familj, slog mig, rev sönder mina kläder. Det är jobbigt att berätta det här, säger hon och hennes ögon tåras.
Hon beskriver en strapatsrik resa. Det hon berättar sedan ekar i så många hedersutsatta flickors och pojkars erfarenheter. Trycket från släkten som hårdnar, som blir till ett krav, ett hot. Vittnesmål som vi måste lyssna på. Sara beskriver hur hennes pappa började pressa henne att återvända till maken.
– Tänk på min heder, sa min pappa, och jag mådde väldigt dåligt, säger Sara.
Enligt Sara utsattes hon även för hot från sin make och hans släktingar.
– “Om vi hittar dig så dödar vi dig. Om du inte säger var du är så tar vi din syster i stället”, sa de över telefon. Min syster var bara nio år då. Min mamma och syster lever fortfarande gömda i Iran.
Migrationsverket föreslår i sitt beslut att hennes make kunde möta upp henne vid flygplatsen. “Du har uppgett att du är gift och har en make som är bosatt i din hemby. Du har inte gjort sannolikt att han utgör en hotbild mot dig. Han utgör således ett manligt nätverk för dig.”
(3) The reference list contains 10 items, but strikingly omits the one text that almost the entire Section 2 of the paper attempts to engage with, namely my February 2017 blog post Vulgopopperianism. That was probably not by mistake, because at the first point in Section 2 in which it is mentioned, its URL address is provided. So why the omission? I cannot think of a reason other than that, perhaps due to some grudge against me, the author wishes to avoid giving me the bibliometric credit that mentioning it in the reference list would yield. (But then why mention my book Here Be Dragons in the reference list? Puzzling.)
(4) In my Vulgopopperianism blog post I discuss two complementary hypotheses (H1) and (H2) regarding whether superintelligence is achievable by the year 2100. Early in Section 2 of his paper, Dubhashi quotes me correctly as saying in my blog post that "it is not a priori obvious which of hypotheses (H1) and (H2) is more plausible than the other, and as far as burden of proof is concerned, I think the reasonable thing is to treat them symmetrically", but in the very next sentence he goes overboard by claiming that "Häggström suggests [...] that one can assign a prior belief of 50% to both [(H1) and (H2)]". I suggest no such thing in my blog post, and certainly do not advocate such a position (unless one reads the word "can" in Dubhashi's claim absurdly literally, meaning "it is possible for a Bayesian to set up a model in which each of the hypotheses has probability 50%"). If the sentence that he quoted from my blog post had contained the passage "as far as a priori probabilities are concerned" rather then "as far as burden of proof is concerned", then his claim would have been warranted. But the fact is that I talked about "burden of proof", not "a priori probabilities", and it is clear from this and from the surrounding context that what I was discussing was Popperian theory of science rather than Bayesianism.1 It is still possible that the mistake was done in good faith. Perhaps, despite being a highly qualified university professor, Dubhashi does not understand the distinction (and tension) between Popperian and Bayesian theory of science.2
2) If this last speculation is correct, then one can make a case that I am partly to blame. In Chapter 6 of Here Be Dragons - which Dubhashi had read and liked - I treated Popperianism vs Bayesianism at some length, but perhaps I didn't explain things sufficiently clearly.
“Human civilization could end up going in radically different directions, for better or for worse. What we do today could affect the outcome. It is vital that we understand possible long-term trajectories and set policy accordingly. The stakes are quite literally astronomical,” says lead author Dr. Seth Baum, Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, a non-profit think tank in the US.
The scholars find that status quo trajectories are unlikely to persist over the long-term. Whether humanity succumbs to catastrophe or achieves a more positive trajectory depends on what people do today.
“In order to succeed it is important to have a plan. Long-term success of humanity depends on our ability to foresee problems and to plan accordingly,” says co-author Roman Yampolskiy, Associate Professor of Computer Engineering and Computer Science at University of Louisville. “Unfortunately, very little research looks at the long-term prospects for human civilization. In this work, we identify some likely challenges to long-term human flourishing and analyze their potential impact. This is an important step toward successfully navigating such challenges and ensuring a thriving future for humanity.”
The scholars emphasize the enormous scales of the long-term future. Depending on one’s ethical perspective, the long-term trajectories of human civilization can be a crucial factor in present-day decision-making.
“The future is potentially exceedingly vast and long,” says co-author Anders Sandberg, Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at University of Oxford. “We are in a sense at the dawn of history, which is a surprisingly powerful position. Our choices – or lack of decisions – will strongly shape which trajectory humanity will follow. Understanding what possible trajectories there are and what value they hold is the first step towards formulating strategies for our species.”