Jag fröjdar mig varje gång jag tycker mig se att jag bidragit (åtminstone på ett litet hörn) till att engagera en kollega att delta konstruktivt i den viktiga diskussionen kring så kallade existentiella risker, dvs sådant som riskerar föra med sig mänsklighetens undergång. Likaså fröjdar jag mig var gång jag ser ett veritabelt rallarslagsmål övergå i civiliserat samtal. Jag har därför dubbla anledningar att fröjda mig åt det meningsutbyte om existentiell risk som Christian Munthe (bioetiker och professor i praktisk filosofi vid Göteborgs universitet) och jag påbörjade förra året och som pågår ännu, om än lågintensivt.
Fotnot
1) Här är den centrala passagen, från sidorna 242-244 i Here Be Dragons: Those who, for one reason or another, are critical of the study of existential risk - as presented in
Chapter 8, Section 10.3, and several other parts of this book - tend to rejoice in comparing that study to Pascal's Wager. A recent blog post
by Swedish bioethicist Christian Munthe may serve as an example. Munthe says that "what drives the
argument [for why we should do something to prevent a particular existential catastrophe] is the (mere) possibility of a massively
significant outcome, and the (mere) possibility of a way to prevent that particular outcome, thus doing masses of good", he goes
on to compare this to the (mere) possibility that Pascal's God exists, and he poses the rhetorical question that is also the title of his blog post: "Why aren't existential risk/ultimate harm argument advocates all attending mass?"
Crucial to Munthe's argument is the clumping together of a wide class of very dissimilar concepts as "the (mere) possibility of a massively significant outcome". Unfortunately, his blog post lacks specific pointers to the literature, but it is clear from the context that what is under attack here are publications like Bostrom and Ćirković (2008) and Bostrom (2013, 2014) - all of them heavily referenced (usually approvingly) in the present book. So for concreteness, let us consider the main existential risk scenario discussed in Bostrom (2014), namely
(S1) The emergence of a superintelligent AI that has goals and values in poor alignment with our own and that wipes us out as a result.
This is, if I understand Munthe correctly, a "(mere) possibility of a massively significant outcome". This makes sense if we take it to mean a scenario that we still do not understand well enough to assign it a probability (not even an approximate one) to be plugged into a decision-theoretic analysis à la Section 6.7. But Munthe conflates this with another sense of "(mere) possibility", more on which shortly.
First, however, consider Munthe's parallel to Pascal's Wager, and note that Pascal didn't have in mind just any old god, but a very specific one, in a scenario that I take the liberty of summarizing as follows:
(S2) The god Yahweh created man and woman with
original sin. He later impregnated a woman with a child that was in some sense also himself. When the child had grown up, he sacrificed it (and thus, in some sense, himself) to save us from sin. But only those of us who worship him and go to church. The rest will be sent to hell.
Munthe and I appear to be in full agreement that (S2) is a far-fetched and implausible hypothesis, unsupported by either evidence or rational argument. And, as Munthe points out, there are innumerable possible versions of the god that lures you with threats and promises of damnation and salvation, and what that particular god may demand in return, often implying a ban on meeting a competing deity's demands, so the wager doesn't seem to tell you to try to start believing in any particular of all these (merely) possible gods.
In particular, Pascal's Wager succumbs to the following scenario (S3), which
appears at least as plausible as (S2) but under which Pascal's choice of
going to church becomes catastrophically counterproductive. (S3) There exists an omnipotent deity, Baal, who likes atheists and lets them into heaven. The only people whom he sends to hell instead are those who make him jeleaous by worshiping some other deity.
Next, for Munthe's argument to work, he needs scenario (S1) to share (S2)'s far-fetchedness, implausibility and lack of rational support. He writes that there seems to be an innumerable amount of thus (merely) possible existential risk scenarios, as well as innumerable (merely) possibly workable technologies that might help to prevent or mitigate each of these, and it is unlikely (to say the least) that we have resources to bet substantially on them all, unless we spread them so thin that this action becomes meaningless.
Is (S1) really just one of these "innumerable" risk scenarios? There are strong arguments that it is not, and that it does not have the
properties of being far-fetched and implausible. It may perhaps, at first sight, seem far-fetched and implausible to someone who
is as unfamiliar with the existential risk literature as Munthe appears to be. Bostrom (2014) and others offer a well-argued and
rational defense of the need to consider (S1) as a serious possibility. If Munthe wishes to argue that (S1) does not merit such
attention, he needs to concretely address those arguments (or at least the somewhat sketchy account of them that I offer in Sections
4.5 and 4.6 of the present book), rather than tossing around vague and unwarranted parallels to Pascal's Wager.
The crucial point is this. There are cases where a phenomenon seems to be possible, although we do not yet understand it well enough to be ready to meaningfully assign it a probability - not even an approximate probability. In such cases, we may speak of a "(mere) possibility". But we must not be misled, along with Munthe, by this expression into thinking that this implies that the phenomenon has extremely low probability.
